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Divisive Times
May 27, 2018 Leslie Francis Beyond Disadvantage: Disability, Law and
Bioethics, Disability, Health Law Policy, Leslie Francis

By Leslie Francis
Another anniversary of President Bush’s signing of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) is coming up in late July, yet the nation
remains far from offering even a semblance of equitable societal
opportunity to most individuals with disabilities.
For them, full social participation is dismissed as merely an idealistic
dream. With its focus on restoration of full functioning for patients, the
health care delivery system might be supposed an exception, but a
closer look shows the opposite is true.
Physicians’ offices, clinics, and hospitals too often have not been
made accessible. Too frequently, these facilities have diagnostic or
treatment equipment that some people, due to disability, cannot use.
Health care provider staff are not trained to interact with or assess
disabled individuals, and may be swayed by implicit biases that target
disability, just as are non-medical personnel or laypersons in the
population.
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As for the courts, the Supreme Court’s decision over thirty years ago
in Alexander v. Choate continues to reassure states in their efforts to
curtail access to their Medicaid programs in ways that
disproportionately affect people with disabilities. In fact, over the
years since enactment of the ADA, the courts—and the US Supreme
Court most notably—have been especially frustrating crafters of
barriers to disability civil rights, so much so that the usually divided
Congress came together across the aisles to pass the ADA
Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008.
In creating the ADAAA, the Congress responded most forcefully, and
almost unanimously, to the Court’s determinations that people do not
count as disabled unless they are virtually unable to do any of the
ordinary activities of daily living—so direly impaired, that is, that even
with accommodation to their disabilities or modifications to expunge
physical, sensory, intellectual or emotional barriers, they cannot make
use of societal opportunity or execute any socially useful role.

The ADAAA addressed the problem of who is disabled,
but not the more basic problem of what disability civil
rights require.
Since enactment of the ADAAA, people seeking to use that statute to
enforce their civil rights have been far less likely to find their claims
dismissed on the ground that they fall outside of the group of people
the statute was designed to protect. But they now find their claims
dismissed without trial on the grounds that they were not qualified or
eligible for what they sought, or that their exclusion was not on the
basis of their disability. The ADAAA addressed the problem of who is
disabled, but not the more basic problem of what disability civil rights
require.
In our contribution to the upcoming Petrie-Flom Center symposium
Beyond Disadvantage: Disability, Law, and Bioethics, Anita Silvers
and I develop an account of disability civil rights in access to health
care. Our account explicates the concept of “meaningful access” put
forth in Alexander v. Choate but ever since applied in a way that has
proved misleading. In that decision—upholding Tennessee’s cutback
in hospital stays for Medicaid patients to fourteen days annually
against a challenge that it disparately impacted the disabled—the
Court said that the Rehabilitation Act required federally funded
programs to give meaningful access to their benefits to the disabled
and non-disabled alike. But the Court also said that because people
with disabilities and people without disabilities each had access to the
fourteen days, the standard of meaningful access was met, even if
due to their disabilities some people could not access adequate
treatment in that short time.
That flawed reasoning resulted from the Court’s failure to take into
account a critical difference between two ways of responding to
difference: accommodation and modification. Here’s what the
difference is, and why it matters: “Accommodations” make
adjustments for individual differences, so that people with disabilities
can perform jobs, participate in activities, or receive services.

“Modifications” change practices or policies or reconstruct the built
environment; their effects extend beyond particular individuals.
Accommodations are justified by and require evidence of individual
needs and abilities. Modifications are subject to different challenges:
that they are inconvenient, expensive, inefficient, or distributively
unjust. Modifications may also be inclusive in ways that extend
beyond disabilities, as curb cuts famously do by facilitating pushing
strollers and baby carriages in crossing streets.
If a request for a modifying policy change is seen as an individual
accommodation, or a request for an individual accommodation is
confused with a demand for policy change, the results for disability
civil rights can be dire—and that’s exactly what happened as the
Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act, and ultimately the ADA.
The first major case interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, Southeastern
Community College v. Davis created exactly this confusion. Here the
Court failed to deal critically with the College’s shift in the terms of
analysis from accommodation for a student nurse to modification of
an entire nursing curriculum, and thus failed to address whether the
College’s outright refusal to consider any accommodation or weigh
Davis’s potential with accommodation for a useful nursing career,
was unreasonable.
The Court’s initial mistake in Davis was compounded in Alexander v.
Choate. The disabled plaintiffs in Tennessee sought a modification of
Tennessee’s length of stay policy for Medicaid recipients. Instead,
they were perceived by the Court as seeking unreasonable
accommodations for themselves. The Court construed them as
asserting “affirmative action” in the form of maximally effective
treatment, a demand that was easy to re-imagine in terms of unfair
advantage. Instead, the Court should have examined whether
Tennessee’s outright refusal to consider even the possibility of
reasonable modification of the policy so that disabled people’s access
to medical care might be meaningful discriminated against the
disabled.
In our contribution to the symposium, we explore how this distinction

between accommodations and modifications can facilitate
understanding meaningful access to health care.
Sometimes, all that is required is accommodation to enable a person
with a disability to receive a benefit that is equitable. But sometimes,
policies, practices, and environments must be modified, in which case
health care providers should consider offering access to care in ways
that offer more inclusive and meaningful participation for all.

